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ABSTRACT: 
In recent years a number of biologists, anthropologists, and animal scientists have tried to 
explain  the  biological  evolution  of  morality,  and  claim  to  have  found  the  rudiments  of 
morality in the altruistic or cooperative behavior of our nearest nonhuman relatives. In this 
paper, I argue that there is one feature of morality to which these accounts do not pay 
adequate  attention:  normative  self-government,  the  capacity  to  be  motivated  to  do 
something by the thought that you ought to do it. This is a feature of the form of moral 
motivation rather than merely of its content, one that I believe we do not share with non-
rational animals. Unlike his more recent followers, Darwin, drawing on the sentimentalist 
tradition  in  moral  philosophy,  did  try  to  explain  how  this  capacity  evolved.  I  explain 
Darwin’s account and the way it drew on sentimentalist philosophy, and argue that such 
accounts are unsatisfactory.  Drawing on the more radical accounts of the evolution of 
morality found in thinkers like Nietzsche and Freud, I speculate that moral motivation may 
have  originated  with  the  internalization  of  the  dominance  instincts,  and  sketch  the 
beginnings of the path that the development of reason in both its theoretical and practical 
employments might have followed. Reflections on the Evolution of Morality                                                                                                               2 
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All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this 
is  what  I  call  the  internalization  of  man:    thus  it  was  that  man  first 
developed  what  was  later  called  his  “soul.”    The  entire  inner  world, 
originally  as  thin  as  if  it  were  stretched  between  two  membranes, 
expanded and extended itself, acquiring depth, breadth, and height, in the 
same measure as outward discharge was inhibited. 
 
                              - Nietzsche1 
 
 
1. Introduction  
  In recent years there has been a fair amount of speculation about the evolution of 
morality, among scientists and philosophers alike. From both points of view, the question 
how our moral nature might have evolved  is  interesting because morality is one of the 
traditional candidates for a distinctively human attribute, something that makes us different 
from the other animals. From a scientific point of view, it matters whether there are any 
such attributes because of the special burden they seem to place on the theory of evolution. 
Beginning  with  Darwin’s  own  efforts  in The  Descent  of  Man,  defenders  of the theory of 
evolution have tried to show either that there are no genuinely distinctive human attributes – 
that is, that any differences between human beings and the other animals are a matter of 
degree – or that apparently distinctive human attributes can be explained in terms of the 
                                                 
1 The Genealogy of Morals, in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale (New York:  Random House, 1967, Vintage Books edition, 1989), pp. 84-5. Hereinafter cited as 
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interaction between other attributes that are matters of degree.  Darwin’s own account of the 
evolution of morality, which I will be discussing later, is of this second kind. 
  From  a  philosophical  point  of  view,  of  course,  understanding  the  ways  we  are 
different from the other animals is one way of understanding ourselves.  And although it is a 
little  obscure  exactly  how  it  works,  one  of  the  traditional  modes  of  philosophical 
understanding, especially of morality, is the origin story:  think, for instance, of the accounts 
of morality that we find in Hobbes, or Nietzsche, or Rousseau.
2  All of these thinkers try to 
throw light on what it means to be human by telling us stories about how moral motives, 
emotions, or even obligations themselves might have emerged from events or processes that 
are envisioned as historical.  So it is natural to think that an evolutionary account of morality 
might somehow throw light on the phenomenon itself.
3 
  I am tempted by this possibility, but, just for that reason, I am dissatisfied with some 
recent biological accounts of the evolution of morality.  In Section Two, I will explain why I 
think there is a problem with these accounts.  Basically, the problem is that it is unclear how 
they can explain the emergence of what I call “normative self-government”: the capacity to 
be motivated to do something by the thought that you ought to do it.  In Section Three, I 
                                                 
2 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Edwin Curley.  Indianapolis:  Hackett Publishing Company, 1994.  Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, see especially Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (translated by Donald Cress;  Indianapolis:  
Hackett  Publishing  Company,  1992),  and  On  the  Social  Contract  (translated  by  Donald  Cress;  Indianapolis:  
Hackett Publishing Company, 1988. 
3 Philosophers at present do not go in much for origin stories.  Analytic philosophy these days has become a 
crisp  no-nonsense  discipline,  aligning  itself  with  the  sciences  rather  than  with  literature,  and  rejecting  any 
modes of understanding whose methodological credentials are obscure.  Since philosophy is a discipline of self-
understanding, we are of course right to try to understand our own methods where we can.  But crisp no-
nonsense attitudes often express nothing more than a lack of imagination, and a desire to eliminate perplexity 
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will  explore  some  solutions to  that  problem  that  have  emerged  from  the  sentimentalist 
tradition  of  moral  philosophy,  including  Darwin’s  own  solution,  which  drew  on  that 
tradition.  And I will explain why I think those solutions don’t work.  My own account of 
morality is in a sense intended to address the problem, but in Section Four I will explain why 
it might seem to leave the difficulty in place.  Finally, in Section Five, I will draw on an 
earlier tradition of theorizing about the evolution of morality, to suggest a possible origin 
story of my own.  
 
2. Moral Content and Normative Self-Government   
  Many of the traditional candidates for distinctively human attributes seem to have 
given way to recent discoveries or rediscoveries about the other animals.  Animal scientists 
have established that many of the other animals acquire much of their know-how through 
learning rather than innate instinct, that some of the other animals use and manufacture 
tools,  that  some  of  them  have  local  cultural  traditions  concerning  what  to  eat,  how  to 
prepare it, and how to medicate themselves, and so on, and that a few can be taught some of 
the basic elements of language.  So it is not surprising that scientists have also gone looking 
for the rudiments of morality in our non-human relatives, and have claimed to find such 
rudiments in the evidence of tendencies to altruism, cooperation, empathy, or reconciliatory 
behavior that can be observed among some of the social animals.  
  The research supporting these kinds of claims has met with a degree of controversy 
that is a little puzzling.  It is not surprising that those who reject the theory of evolution 
should dispute them; but it may seem surprising that scientists themselves, who presumably 
accept it, should still sometimes hotly contend for the uniquely human character of some of Reflections on the Evolution of Morality                                                                                                               5 
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these  attributes.    Those  who  teach  the  other  animals  to  communicate  linguistically,  for 
example, may be met with the claim that what the animal learns is not really language until 
the syntax reaches a certain level of complexity.  By raising the standards for what counts as 
having a certain attribute, we can perhaps preserve its distinctiveness, but what is the point 
of the exercise?  It is not uncommon for those who wish defend our continuity with the 
other animals to speculate that there is some lingering piece of pride or ego at work in these 
controversies, something that makes human beings want to believe that we are unique among 
the animals.   
  I am sympathetic to the worry, and yet, I must also confess that I am inclined to 
believe that something I call “reason,” one of whose manifestations is something I call 
“morality,” is a distinctively human attribute, and one that might explain a lot of what seems 
to be so different about human beings.   
  But it is important to be clear about what I mean by “reason” here, and about its 
implications for the question of evolution.  The primatologist Frans De Waal, in Primates and 
Philosophers, distinguishes two schools of thought about morality.  According to one of them, 
he tells us, morality is “a cultural innovation achieved by our species alone,” where this is 
supposed to imply that “our ancestors became moral by choice.”  The other, his own theory, 
“views  morality  as  a  direct  outgrowth  of  the  social  instincts  we  share  with  the  other 
animals.”
4  He  associates  the  two  views  loosely  with  the  rationalist  and  sentimentalist 
traditions in moral philosophy, and suggests that according to proponents of the rationalist 
                                                 
4 Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved. Lectures by Frans De Waal with commentary by Robert Wright, 
Christine  M.  Korsgaard,  Philip  Kitcher,  and  Peter  Singer,  edited  by  Stephen  Macedo  and  Josiah  Ober.  
Princeton:  Princeton University Press:  2006, p. 6. Reflections on the Evolution of Morality                                                                                                               6 
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view, morality is not something about which it is appropriate to tell an evolutionary story at 
all.   
  In fact I know of no philosophical view according to which human beings “became 
moral by choice,” as De Waal puts it. But we might take De Waal’s description of the 
rationalist position as a rough characterization of the sort of neo-Hobbesian or contractarian 
view according to which morality is founded on something like a social contract, entered 
into for reasons of self-interest.
5  Such views take it for granted that “reason” is the standard 
of doing what is in your own best interests, and argue that morality is “rational” in the sense 
that it promotes those interests. When I talk about morality being a manifestation of reason, 
I am not talking about that sort of thing, but rather about views according to which moral 
laws are themselves principles of reason – such as rational intuitionist views, or Kant’s view 
that the categorical imperative is a principle of reason.
6  And I do think that “reason,” in the 
sense that supports those theories, is something that must have evolved.  So when I suggest 
that  morality  is  a  manifestation  of  reason,  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  there  is  no 
evolutionary story to tell about its origins.  But I do mean to register one source of my 
dissatisfaction with some of the current attempts to trace the evolution of morality, which is 
                                                 
5 For one example of a neo-Hobbesian view of this kind see David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement.  Clarendon 
Press:  Oxford, 1986. 
6 By “rational intuitionist” views, I have in mind the long tradition of views represented by Samuel Clarke 
(Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion: The Boyle Lectures 1705) and Richard Price 
(Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, first published 1758) in the eighteenth century; William 
Whewell (The Elements of Morality, 1845) in the nineteenth century; G. E. Moore (Principia Ethica, 1903), W. D. 
Ross (The Right and the Good, 1930) in the twentieth century, and, arguably, T. M. Scanlon (What We Owe to Each 
Other, 1998) and Derek Parfit (On What Matters, forthcoming) as we move into the twenty-first.  Kant’s views 
are found primarily in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and The 
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that  I  think  that  what  they  are  trying  to  explain  –  which  is  characteristically  altruism, 
cooperation, sharing, and so forth – is not quite the thing that needs to be explained.  
  Morality, as treated in these kinds of accounts, is defined by its characteristic content, 
which has something to do with, say, social relationships which take the interests of others 
into account. Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, in their book Wild Justice, say, for example, 
“We define morality as a suite of interrelated other-regarding behaviors that cultivate and 
regulate  complex  interactions  within  social  groups.”
7  And  De  Waal,  in  Primates  and 
Philosophers, claims that the essence of human morality is taking “the interests of the entire 
community into account.”
8 In the discussion following the lectures that make up that book, 
at which I was present, De Waal remarked that he regarded morality as “a system of conflict 
resolution.” 
  But to someone working in the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant – or for that 
matter, as we will see, of Hume and Adam Smith – the characterization of morality as “a 
system of conflict resolution” or of a tendency to good social behavior is bound to sound a 
little thin.  These philosophers, or so I want to protest, had something rather grander in 
mind.
9  They were talking about what they took to be our unique human capacity to take 
responsibility for ourselves, to give shape and form to our own identities or characters, and 
to make laws for our own conduct.  They were talking not just about a relation in which we 
                                                 
7 Wild Justice:  The Moral Lives of Animals.  Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press,  2009, p. 7. 
8 Primates and Philosophers, p. 58.   
9 “Grander” may make it sound as if I am claiming that human beings are in some way superior to the other 
animals, but I am not.  When I say that human beings are the only moral animals, I mean that we are the only 
animals who are subject to moral standards – who can be either morally good or bad.  I do not think that 
having that property is itself a virtue.  I explain more exactly why in “Valuing Our Humanity,” currently in 
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stand to others, but about a relation in which we stand to ourselves, which it does not seem 
very  tempting  to  attribute  to  any  of  the  other  animals.    Morality  so  regarded  is  one 
manifestation of the human capacity for what I am calling “normative self-government.”  
Normative self-government is our capacity to assess the potential grounds of our beliefs and 
actions, to ask whether they constitute good reasons, and to regulate our beliefs and actions 
accordingly.    In  the  theoretical  realm,  the  capacity  for  normative  self-government  is 
expressed in the deliberate construction of systems of belief, employing consciously held 
standards of good evidence and valid argument.  In the practical realm, it is expressed most 
obviously  in  the  capacity  to  act  from  what  we  familiarly  call  “a  sense  of  obligation,” 
grounded in consciously held principles of good or right action.  To be morally motivated in 
this sense is not just to have motives with a certain characteristic content.  Moral motivation 
has a distinct – and I believe a distinctively human – form.  I think that that, the human 
capacity  for  normative  self-government,  and  not  just  good  social  behavior,  is  the  thing 
whose evolution needs to be explained.  
  Of course, everyone involved in these discussions grants that morality is not merely a 
tendency to good social behavior.  If altruistic and cooperative behavior were the essence of 
morality, the ants and bees would be our moral heroes, and no one supposes that they are.
 
And everyone also agrees that what these thinkers call “human morality” plainly involves 
something over and above altruistic or cooperative dispositions: some cognitive element 
such as the ability to follow explicit rules, or the self-conscious use of moral concepts, or the 
related capacity to make and be motivated by moral judgments. But explaining how that 
capacity arose is not usually part of the biologist’s enterprise. In my commentary on De Waal 
in Primates and Philosophers, I claimed that the essence of morality rests in normative self-Reflections on the Evolution of Morality                                                                                                               9 
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government rather than in altruism or cooperation.
10 Bekoff and Pierce, commenting in part 
on those remarks, say that they regard such matters as being motivated by conscious moral 
judgments as “relatively late evolutionary additions to the suite of moral behaviors.”
11 De 
Waal himself, in his response to the commentaries, suggested that the human capacity for 
“internal dialogue” “lifts moral behavior to a level of abstraction and self-reflection unheard 
of before our species entered the evolutionary scene.”
12  I don’t know exactly what these 
authors have in mind, but such remarks may suggest the idea that what is distinctive about 
“human morality” is the result of adding some kind of advanced intellectual faculties onto 
sociable instincts or desires. But exactly which advanced intellectual faculties are supposed to 
be involved and how adding them to social instincts is supposed to produce a normatively 
self-governing animal is left rather vague.  So something more needs to be said. 
   
3. Darwin and the Sentimentalist Tradition 
  Unlike many of his more recent followers, Darwin did attempt to fill in this gap.  
Darwin took a keen interest in the sentimentalist tradition of moral philosophy that gave rise 
to the utilitarian theory that was dominant in his day.  No doubt this was partly because of 
the time and place in which he lived, but I think it is also because philosophers in the 
sentimentalist  tradition  had  tried  to  give  an  answer  to  the  question  how  the  sense  of 
obligation might be something that human beings acquired.  David Hume gives us one 
picture of how that might be.  Leaving aside a complication about what Hume calls the 
                                                 
10 Primates and Philosophers, pp. 112-16. 
11 Wild Justice, pp. 139-40. 
12 Primates and Philosophers, p. 175. Reflections on the Evolution of Morality                                                                                                               10 
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“artificial” virtues, Hume thinks that moral standards are the result of our approving and 
disapproving of motives that we already, naturally, have.
13  Approval and disapproval are 
themselves sentiments, but they require advanced intellectual faculties for two reasons.  First, 
as Hume himself emphasized, they arise only when we look at things from an impartial 
perspective that we must use reasoning to achieve.
14 Second, they require what contemporary 
ethologists call “theory of mind” – an awareness that people and animals have mental states, 
including motives, since those are the main objects of approval and disapproval.
15   
  In Hume’s account approval and disapproval are not in themselves motives – they 
are sentiments we feel about motives, our own and other people’s.  But Hume has a pretty 
good story about how it is possible for us to be motivated by the standards we form as a 
result of our approvals and disapprovals – how it is possible for us to be motivated by 
thoughts about what we ought to do.
16  Approval and disapproval are, according to Hume, 
                                                 
13 For Hume’s account of the “natural virtues” see especially Treatise of Human Nature (edited by L. A. Selby-
Bigge, 2nd edition revised by P. H. Nidditch.  Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1978), Book 3, Part 3, Section 1, pp. 
574-91 (Hereinafter abbreviated as, for example, Treatise 3.3.1, 574-91).  In “Natural Motives and the Motive of 
Duty:  Hume and Kant on Our Duties to Others” (Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice, 1(2), 2009, pp. 
8-35), I argue that Hume’s account of the operation of the motive of duty in the case of the artificial virtues 
differs only slightly from Kant’s account of the operation of that motive.  It is little more than a matter of 
whether the moral sense operates through the mediation of self-disapproval, or directly as a kind of will.  In a 
sense, the argument of this paper makes a similar point: whatever tells us what is right and wrong must operate 
directly as a volitional principle for acting accordingly. 
14 See especially David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (in David Hume, Enquiries Concerning 
Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd edition revised by P. H. 
Nidditch.  Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 173.  Hereinafter abbreviated as Enquiry. 
15 Hume affirms this at Treatise 3.2.1, 477, but in fact his practice does not conform to it; he also praises, e. g.  
qualities of character such as courage and industry which are not in themselves motives. 
16 Or rather, to put the point more strictly, he has a story to tell about how the standards we form as a result of 
our approval and disapproval become standards that tell us what we “ought” to do.  I prefer to put the point that Reflections on the Evolution of Morality                                                                                                               11 
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forms of love and hate – a kind of disinterested love and hate that we feel when we view 
things from an impartial standpoint, not governed by our own self-interest.
17  These feelings 
of  distinterested  love  and  hate  arise  because  we  sympathize  with  the  victims  and 
beneficiaries of an agent’s conduct, and love or hate that agent accordingly.  So to know that 
you yourself are an object of the disapproval of others is see yourself as an object of their 
hatred.  And since our natural sympathy with other people induces us to enter into what we 
suppose  to  be  their  feelings,  it  induces  us  to  turn  this  hatred  against  ourselves.  This 
motivates us to conform to moral standards: we wish to be lovable in the eyes of others, 
because we wish to be lovable in our own. Just to make sure I haven’t confused you here, let 
me emphasize that sympathy plays a double role in Hume’s theory:  impartial sympathy with 
the  victims  and  beneficiaries  of  action  determines  what  we  approve  and  disapprove  of; 
sympathy with the approval and disapproval of imagined moral judges then motivates us act 
in ways we ourselves approve of, so that we can be lovable in our own eyes. Of course, one 
might complain that this theory does not really imply that, strictly speaking, we are motivated 
to  do  what  we  ought  to  do simply by  the  judgment,  or  by  what  goes  into  making  the 
judgment, that we ought to do it.
18  Rather, it implies that we are motivated to do what we 
                                                                                                                                                
way, because I am an “internalist” about the moral “ought.” “Ought” is a word used to express a practical 
judgment, so I do not think anything could count as a judgment about what you “ought to do” that is not 
capable of motivating you to do it.  Practical normative force does not reduce to motivational force, but must 
always include it.  Hume himself seems to accept something along these lines, for he famously criticized his 
rationalist opponents for being unable to explain how moral considerations, if they were grounded in reason – 
a faculty he regarded as inactive and inert - could possibly motivate us. 
17 Treatise 3.3.5, 614. 
18 I have inserted the caveat, “or what goes into making the judgment,” to make sure that what I say here 
covers two different theories about what we mean when we say someone is motivated to do something by the Reflections on the Evolution of Morality                                                                                                               12 
Christine M. Korsgaard 
 
 
 
ought to do because that is a way of avoiding self-hatred.
19 That there is a problem shows up 
in this fact: the same mechanism that motivates us to do what we ourselves approve of 
would  motivate  us  to  avoid  the  disapproval  of  others  even  if  we  thought  that  their 
disapproval was ill-founded.  Sympathy, as Hume understands it, tends to make us hate 
ourselves if we think others either do or would hate us regardless of the causes of their hate. 
  Adam Smith modified this story in several ways, two of which are important for our 
purposes. Hume thought of approval and disapproval as forms of love and hate based on 
sympathy with the victims and beneficiaries of the conduct of the person who is morally 
judged. Smith, on the other hand, thought of approval itself as a form of sympathy with the 
                                                                                                                                                
thought that he ought to do it.  In Hume’s theory, to say that you do something because you think you ought 
to is to say that doing what you ought to do is your purpose in acting.  In such a theory, explicitly moral 
motivation necessarily appears as an alternative to being motivated by other sorts of considerations, such as, 
say,  “in order to help.”  In other theories, however, the thought that you ought to do something is a thought 
that is among other things about which purposes you ought to adopt.  To by motivated by duty is not to have a 
certain purpose, but to choose your acts and their purposes on the basis of a certain principle. For example, in 
Kant’s theory, to be motivated by duty is to be motivated by the conception of your maxim – which includes 
both your act and its purpose - as a necessary universal law. Or, to take a more recent example, in Scanlon’s 
theory it is to be motivated by the idea that doing a certain act for a certain purpose can be justified to others.  
In these cases, what motivates the agent is not the bare idea “that is my duty” but the thoughts about law or 
justification that go into making the judgment that that is my duty.  And in these cases the other considerations 
– say, that someone needs help – appear in the thoughts that go into making the judgment:  that you could not 
will it as a law that no one help, or justify a failure to help for certain reasons, to others.   
19 In fact Hume is explicit about this.  “But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action? … I 
answer, It may: …When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person who feels his 
heart devoid of that principle, may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the 
motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least to 
disguise to himself, as much as possible, his want of it.” (Treatise 3.1.1, 479) The role of sympathy with imagined 
moral judges is brought out more clearly at Enquiry 276.   Reflections on the Evolution of Morality                                                                                                               13 
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person judged.
20  To disapprove of someone is to be out of sympathy with him.  The other 
important modification is that Smith added a notion of what he called “propriety.”
21  Hume 
thought that our approval and disapproval of motives is aroused by reflections on their 
utility and agreeableness.  We approve of beneficence, say, because it is useful to those to 
whom the beneficent person offers assistance, and we sympathize with them.  Smith argued 
that we also approve and disapprove of motives and the emotions on which they are based 
because  of  their  suitability  or  proportionality  to  the  objects  that  arouse  them.    We 
disapprove of the enraged person, say, because his anger seems out of proportion to the 
little annoyance that caused it, and this makes us unable to sympathize with him. Smith 
believed that strong emotional responses generally seem disproportionate to those who are 
not in the grip of them, and therefore that the tendency of our natural desire to be in 
sympathy with others is to moderate and control our violent responses. The person judged 
tones his responses down in order to win the sympathy of others; at the same time, the 
person making the judgment tries to imagine the situation more vividly in order to enter 
more fully into the feelings of the person who is judged. The eventual ‘compromise’ position 
reached  –  a  level  of  response  that  puts  the  person  judged  and  the  person  judging  in 
sympathy with each other – is the “proper” response.
22  These judgments of “propriety” give 
us the notion of a response being “worthy” of its object: we may say that the cause of 
someone’s rage is “not worth” so strong a feeling.  
                                                 
20 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (edited by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie.  Indianapolis:  Liberty 
Classics:  1982, pp. 9-16. 
21 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, pp. 16-23. 
22 See especially Theory of Moral Sentiments, pp. 21-3. Reflections on the Evolution of Morality                                                                                                               14 
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  Importantly,  we  can  make  judgments  of  “propriety”  about  the  sentiments  of 
approval and disapproval themselves.  So when we do something wrong, we may judge that 
it would be proper for others to disapprove or blame us if they knew.  And when we judge 
that it would be proper for others to blame us, we are judging not merely that others would 
blame us if they knew, but that we are blameworthy.  This appears to solve the problem in 
Hume’s theory:  we are only motivated to avoid conduct that we deem genuinely worthy of 
blame. Smith thought of such judgments as being rendered by what he called “the man 
within,” or the “impartial spectator,” a kind of internalized representative of the other, but 
one  whose  view  of  our  motives  is  unimpeded  and  therefore  reliable.
23    When  we  are 
motivated to avoid the disapproval of the man within, it is as if we are in danger of falling 
out of sympathy with ourselves. 
  We  know  from  his  notebooks  that  Darwin  studied  this  tradition  of  moral 
philosophy, and it seems clear that he was influenced by it when he came to produce his 
own account of the evolution of morality.
24 Darwin argued that the evolution of morality 
could be explained through the interaction of two powers, advanced intellectual faculties and 
social instincts.  As he says:  
“Any  animal  whatever,  endowed  with  well-marked  social  instincts,  would 
inevitably  acquire  a  moral  sense  or  conscience  as  soon  as  its  intellectual 
                                                 
23 Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part III, pp. 108-78. 
24 Metaphysics, Materialism, and the Evolution of Mind:  Early Writings of Charles Darwin. Transcribed and annotated 
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powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well-developed, as in 
man.”
25 
The developed intellectual powers in question, as we will see, turn out to be memory and 
“theory of mind”  - an awareness of our own motives. 
  Darwin’s story turns on the difference between two kinds of instincts. There are 
social instincts, whose influence tends to be felt constantly by a social animal, and there are 
the instincts associated with the appetites, whose felt influence is only occurrent but, when it 
does occur, stronger than that of the social instincts.  It is an important feature of the 
appetites and the instincts associated with them that, once they are satisfied, it is hard to 
recapture the sense of their force and urgency.  So it is often the case that, once we have 
satisfied an appetite, what we have done seems to us not to have been worth it, especially if 
we have done it at the cost of satisfying some other desire or disobeying the call of some 
other instinct. Once our intellectual faculties have developed to the point where we can 
remember and reflect upon our motives and actions, this difference between the two kinds 
of instincts has an important effect.  Darwin explains it this way: 
Thus, as man cannot prevent old impressions continually passing through his 
mind,  he  will  be  compelled  to  compare  the  weaker  impressions  of,  for 
instance, past hunger, or of vengeance satisfied or danger avoided at the cost 
of other men, with the instinct of sympathy and good-will to his fellows, 
which is still present and ever in some degree active in his mind.  He will 
then feel in his imagination that a stronger instinct has yielded to one which 
                                                 
25 The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 71-2.  
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now seems comparatively weak; and then that sense of dissatisfaction will 
inevitably be felt with which man is endowed, like every other animal, in 
order that his instincts may be obeyed.
26 
According  to  Darwin  this  dissatisfaction  is  regret  or  remorse,  and  its  painful  character 
ultimately teaches us to control our appetites when they conflict with our social instincts.  In 
addition, Darwin brings in, as it were direct from Hume, the consideration that even if a man 
does not regret his bad conduct for its own sake, “he will be conscious that if his conduct 
were known to his fellows, it would meet with their disapprobation, and few are so destitute 
of sympathy as not to feel discomfort when this is realized.”
27  
  Of course one might be inclined to protest  – as I did against Hume – that this is not 
really doing what you ought to do because you ought to do it.  We learn to conform to moral 
principles in order to avoid the uncomfortable feeling of “regret” or “remorse.”  Smith, as 
we saw, tried to remedy the problem by adding a normative element to the negative emotion, 
the self-disapproval, itself:  it is not the sense that we will be blamed or that we would be 
blamed if others knew of our bad conduct, but the sense that our conduct would be worthy of 
blame, that motivates us to avoid it. Darwin, I believe, is trying to capture this feature of 
Smith’s theory in his own account by emphasizing the difference in the ways in which the 
two kinds of instincts affect us:  like Smith, he thinks that when we are not immediately in 
the grip of an appetite, it is hard to recapture the sense of urgency we have when we are in its 
grip.  So when we think about it later, it seems to us as if it is not worth satisfying our 
appetites at the cost of the interests of others, and that looks like a normative thought.  
                                                 
26 Descent, p. 90 
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  Nevertheless, Darwin’s account does give rise to a problem similar to the one I 
noticed in Hume’s.  In Hume’s theory, the problem is that the disapproval of others would 
motivate us even if it were not properly grounded in standards of right and wrong.  In 
Darwin’s  theory,  the  parallel  problem  is  that  the  difference  between  constantly  and 
occurently felt instincts would eventually teach us to conform to the constantly felt ones 
even if those were not the social instincts.
28  Why, in Darwin’s theory, are constantly felt 
instincts  the  right  ones  to  act on?  Any  instincts that  were  constant  and  steady  in  their 
influence  would  become  authoritative  over any  instincts  whose  influence  was  occurrent, 
regardless of the content of those instincts.  Darwin is unable to appropriate Smith’s idea 
successfully, because of a problem in Smith’s theory itself:  Smith never really tells us why 
exactly the motives and responses with which others can sympathize are supposed to be the 
right ones to act on, or even why we should tend to think that they are. In the same way, 
Darwin has no story about why constantly felt instincts should be the right ones to act on.  
  Of course, Darwin, unlike Smith, was not trying to produce a general normative 
theory.  In fact he was assuming a vaguely utilitarian framework, although he suggests it is 
not the greatest happiness of the community, but rather something he calls the greatest 
“good or welfare” of the community, at which moral conduct aims.
29  His account of this 
“good or welfare” has a distinctly biological ring.  He says:  “The term, general good, may be 
defined as the means by which the greatest possible number of individuals can be reared in 
full vigor and health, with all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are 
                                                 
28 Darwin actually says it:  “The imperious word ought seems merely to imply the consciousness of the existence 
of a persistent instinct…” Descent, p. 92. 
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exposed.”
30 It might seem easy enough to marry such an account of morality to an account 
of its evolution, but even if we accepted the moral view in question, the problem would still 
exist.  It is not because the social instincts are constant and steady in their influence that it is 
wrong to ignore the interests of others in pursuit of the satisfaction of your own appetites. 
Of course, if you think that all that morality is is the way in which the social instincts express 
themselves in intellectually advanced animals, this point may elude you.  But if you think 
there is more to the idea that an action is wrong than that it is unsociable, then the relation 
between Darwin’s motivational story and the normative one is, after all, too accidental: our 
capacity for moral motivation is a mechanism that just happens to favor the kind of conduct 
that Darwin considers moral.  
  These theories, born of the empiricist tradition of associationist psychology, try to 
explain the origin of normative self-government by showing how some sort of pain gets 
attached to conduct independently identified as wrongful. One might complain that this 
doesn’t give us a person who is normatively self-governed; this still only gives us a person 
who is governed by the desire to avoid pain. But it would be uncharitable to take Darwin or 
Hume to be suggesting that the person’s goal is simply avoid pain, for that is not the only role 
that pain can play in the explanation of action.  We should take them to be explaining, in 
associationistic fashion, how avoiding wrongdoing itself becomes a goal.  So instead I will 
put my point this way.  I think that these theories come very close to explaining moral 
motivation  in  the  right  way.    If  they  were  true,  they  would  succeed  in  explaining  the 
existence of creatures who inevitably find wrongdoing painful.  And although just now I said 
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that the conduct is “independently” identified as wrongful, I did not mean that the causes of 
the conduct’s painfulness and the reasons for its wrongness are totally unrelated.  In Hume’s 
view, the fact that you disapprove of an action is what makes it wrong, and it is also what 
makes it painful for you to do it.  Nevertheless, its being wrong is not what makes it painful 
for you to do it – your desire to be lovable is what does that.
31  And although Darwin 
doesn’t tell us exactly how he arrives at his normative account of the good, I think we may 
say, in a similar way, that in Darwin’s theory, the fact that conduct is against our social 
instincts is both what makes it wrong and what makes it painful.  Nevertheless, it is not 
painful because it is wrong, but because of the way the social instincts express themselves, 
constantly rather than occurrently.  But a normatively self-governed being is one who is 
motivated to avoid wrongful conduct because it is wrong; the motivation must be produced 
by the wrongness itself, not merely attached to it, even if it is non-accidentally attached to it.  
The reasons why actions are right or wrong must be the reasons why we do or avoid them.  
So it looks as if nothing short of what Kant called “pure practical reason” can possibly do 
the job. 
                                                 
31 And what makes you unlovable is not the wrongness of your conduct, but its content:  that it is disagreeable 
or disadvantageous.   To this extent  Hume’s theory shares a problem with the brand of naturalistic moral 
realism that claims that we know moral properties exist because they do play a role in explanation:  say, the 
laborers revolted because they were treated unjustly.  No:   the laborers revolted because they didn’t have 
enough to live on.  Their not having enough to live on was unjust, and was why they revolted, but they didn’t 
revolt because it was unjust; they revolted because their families were hungry.  That would have caused them to 
revolt even if it were not unjust.  (I owe the point to Chris Furlong.) The parallel point about Darwin is a little 
hard to formulate, but it goes like this:  even if it were essential to the nature of social instincts that they be 
expressed constantly rather than occurrently – even if a constant expression and social content had to go 
together – it would be the case that it was the constant-expressedness of the social instincts, rather than the 
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  Actually, I don’t really mean to make such a strong claim, anyway on this occasion.  
My point is rather that whatever it is that makes some actions required and some wrong 
must also be the source of our motivation for doing and avoiding them accordingly.  And 
what makes some actions required or wrong is not merely their content:  that they are 
altruistic, or cooperative, or sociable, or whatever, but rather whatever it is that confers 
normativity  on  that  content,  whatever  it  is  that  makes  it  right  to  act  cooperatively  or 
altruistically or whatever.  Kant does give one answer to that question – what makes an 
action right or wrong is determined by whether its maxim has the form of a law, and he 
claims  that  the  moral  motive  –  respect  for  law  itself  –  is  directly  responsive  to  that 
consideration.  But the more general point is that whatever confers a normative status on 
our actions – whatever makes them right or wrong – must also be what motivates us to do 
or avoid them accordingly, without any intervening mechanism. 
  This may seem to imply that we cannot explain the evolution of morality until we 
have the correct moral theory – until we know what it is that actually makes our actions right 
or wrong.  Among other things, that would mean giving up any hope that thinking about the 
evolution  of  morality  could  throw  any  light  on  morality  itself.    But  I  do  not  take  the 
implication of what I have just been arguing to be quite that strong.  Rather, I take the 
implication to be that no account of the evolution of morality can be complete unless it 
includes an account of why we assign normative properties – rightness or wrongness –  to 
our actions in the first place: that is, to say, of why we think of our actions as the sort of 
thing that must be morally or rationally justified.  And for this we need to know what the 
problem is to which justification, or the assignment of a normative status, is a response.  For 
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can be morally justified must see himself as faced with the problem of justifying his actions 
in the first place, and must be motivated to do what he judges to be right by the fact that it 
solves that problem.  And most of the evolutionary theories on the table these days tell us 
little or nothing about what that problem is or why it arose.  The other animals do not need 
to justify their actions. Why do we?   
 
4.  Self-Consciousness and the Problem of Justification
32 
  My own views are in part an attempt to address the question I just raised.  In this 
section, however, I will explain why it might seem as if they leave the situation pretty much 
in the same place as the sentimentalist views do. I will start by being a little more specific 
about what I think “reason” is.  A non-human animal, I believe, is guided through her 
environment  by  means  of  a  representation  of  that  environment  that  incorporates  both 
perceptual information and appropriate desiderative or aversive responses. What I mean is 
that, for the other animals, perceptual representation and desire and aversion are not strictly 
separate.  The  animal  finds  herself  in  a  world  that  consists  of  things  that  are  directly 
perceived as food or prey, as danger or predator, as potential mate, as child: that is to say, as 
things that are to-be-eaten, to-be-avoided, to-be-mated-with, to-be-cared-for, and so on.  In 
this sense, we might say that an animal’s perception has teleological content:  the objects she 
perceives are marked out as being “for” certain things or as calling for certain responses. I 
believe this because I think it is hard to see how perception could have been of any use to 
                                                 
32 In this section I draw on work that has also appeared in “The Activity of Reason,” Proceedings and Addresses of 
the American Philosophical Association, Volume 83, Number 2:  November 2009.  The remaining sections of this 
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the relatively unintelligent animals in which it first evolved if something like this were not the 
case.  Perception could not merely provide a simple animal with theoretical information on 
the basis of which the animal had to figure out what to do, so it must be that it tells the 
animal what to do.  If you feel tempted to say that it is “instinct” that tells the animal what to 
do, I will reply that I am imagining that this is the form that instinct takes.  But then it is 
important  to  add  that  the  contrast  that  I  want  here  is  not  between  “instinctive”  and 
“learned.”  An animal might learn from experience that certain things are to-be-avoided, but 
if the form that the learning takes is that she now simply sees them that way, as to-be-
avoided, her actions are still “instinctive” in the sense I have in mind. 
  Rational actions, as opposed to ones that are instinctive in this sense, involve a 
certain form of self-consciousness: namely, consciousness of yourself as a subject – the 
subject  of  certain  thoughts,  desires,  experiences  and  so  forth.    I  will  explain  why  in  a 
moment. But first we should ask: are human beings the only animals that are self-conscious 
in this sense?  Some scientists believe that this form of self-consciousness is revealed by the 
ethologist’s mirror test.  In the mirror test, a scientist paints, say, a red spot on an animal’s 
body and then puts her in front of a mirror.  Given certain experimental controls, if the 
animal eventually reaches for the spot and tries to rub it off, or looks away from the mirror 
towards that location on her body, we can take that as evidence that the animal recognizes 
herself in the mirror, and is curious about what has happened to her.  Apes, dolphins, and 
elephants have passed the mirror test, in some cases moving on to use the mirror to examine 
parts of their bodies that they can’t normally see – apparently with great interest.  Other 
animals never recognize themselves, and instead keep offering to fight with the image in the 
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  It is a little difficult to articulate exactly why the mirror test is supposed to reveal an 
awareness of oneself as a subject.  The animal grasps the relation between the image in the 
mirror and her own body.  In so doing, she seems to show that she grasps the relationship 
between herself and her own body. For she grasps the relationship between two things, a 
certain physical body and – well, what? – we can say “and herself” – but what exactly is the 
“herself” that she identifies with that body?  Perhaps the idea is that what she identifies as 
herself is the self that is the subject of her own experiences, for instance the one who sees the 
spot in the mirror, of whose existence she must then have some awareness.   
  Interestingly, however, even if this is right, and shows that the animal knows herself 
as the subject of her experiences, it does not yet show that the animal must be aware of herself 
as the subject of her attitudes – that is, of her beliefs, emotions, and desires.  And this 
suggests a possible division within this form of self-consciousness.  An animal might be 
aware of her experiences and of herself as the subject of those experiences, and yet her 
attitudes might still be invisible to her, because they are a lens through which she sees the 
world, rather than being parts of the world that she sees.
33  In that case, she would still 
function in the way I have called “instinctive.”  The experiences that she was aware of 
having would still be experiences of things as “to-be-eaten” “to-be-fled” “to-be-cared-for” 
and so on; and her responses to those things would still be governed by the teleological 
content of her experiences.   
                                                 
33 It’s easier to understand what I mean here when you are thinking about practical, evaluative attitudes.  It 
sounds odd to think of beliefs as a lens through which we see the world.  But they are, in the sense that an 
animal could be moved by one belief to take up another without having any awareness of making an inference.  
Unlike a person, a non-human animal can think “X” without commitment to “I believe X” or “X is true,” 
because he (probably) has no commitments of that sort.  Reflections on the Evolution of Morality                                                                                                               24 
Christine M. Korsgaard 
 
 
 
  But as rational beings we are aware of our attitudes. We know of ourselves that we 
want certain things, fear certain things, love certain things, believe certain things, and so on.  
And we are also aware of the potential influence of our attitudes on what we will decide to 
do.  We are aware of the potential grounds of our actions – of the ways in which our attitudes 
incline us to respond.
34  And once you are aware of the influence of a potential ground of 
action, you are in a position to decide whether to allow yourself to be influenced in that way 
or not.  As I have put it elsewhere, you now have a certain reflective distance from the 
impulse that is influencing you, and you are in a position to ask yourself, “but should I be 
influenced in that way?”  You are now in a position to raise a normative question, a question 
about whether the action you find yourself inclined to perform is justified.
35 
  Or so I have said in the past.  And we might at first suppose that if something along 
these lines is right, it is easy to explain the evolution of the point of view from which 
normative problems arise.  It is just a matter of a gradual increase in the scope of “theory of 
mind” – our grasp of our inner world expanding from knowledge of ourselves as the subject 
of experiences to knowledge of ourselves as the subject of certain attitudes towards those 
experiences.  But there are several problems with leaving it at that.  The first problem is that 
even if self-consciousness about the grounds of our beliefs and actions makes it possible to 
raise normative questions, in the sense that it makes room for them, that fact by itself does 
                                                 
34 I’ve described the difference between a self-conscious but non-rational animal and a rational animal in terms 
of a difference between being aware of oneself as the subject of one’s experiences and being aware of oneself 
as the subject of one’s attitudes. But more strictly speaking I think that the difference is this:  rational animals 
are aware that the character of our own minds makes a difference in the way that world appears to us, while 
non-rational animals are not.  
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not explain exactly why these questions arise for us or what kind of questions they are.  The 
second problem, which many of my own readers have pointed out to me in the past, is that 
it is not perfectly clear why just being conscious of the grounds of your beliefs and actions 
should be sufficient to put you, as it were, in normative control. It seems perfectly possible 
that we could be aware of a force operating on us mentally, but still be helpless in the face of 
it.  
  So at this point it might look as if my own account needs as a supplement just the 
sort of theory that the sentimentalists offered – we are aware of what goes on in our own 
minds, and in particular of the motivational forces at work upon us, but now something 
must motivate us to take control of those forces and redirect them in accordance with 
normative standards. But I have already argued that such an account cannot work. The 
trouble with this picture, I now believe, may be that it gets things the wrong way around.  
We are not able to take control of our mental attitudes because we are aware of them.  
Rather, I will suggest, our awareness of our own mental attitudes is a product of our efforts to 
take control over what goes on in our minds.
36  
   
5. The Origins of Rationality 
  Before I explain what I have in mind, I want to remind you of an older line of 
thought about the evolution of morality, proposed in slightly different ways by Nietzsche, in 
the Genealogy of Morals, and Freud, in works like Civilization and its Discontents and Totem and 
                                                 
36 This formulation is not quite right but will be refined below.  There is a sense in which it is our awareness of 
our mental attitudes that is at stake, but there is also a sense, which I will explain, in which their very existence 
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Taboo.
37 Both were concerned in particular about the origin of guilt, and both suggested that 
guilt originated when an animal who was not allowed to give expression to his aggressive 
instincts turned those aggressive instincts against himself.  Suffering from guilt is a way of 
hurting yourself, done for the sheer satisfaction of hurting someone when you need to hurt 
someone and are not allowed to do it.  In Nietzsche’s theory guilt is continuous with the 
self-mutiliating behavior often observed in animals kept in cages, and for that matter in 
unhappy human children. The originator of what Nietzsche called “the bad conscience” was 
“the  man  who,  from  lack  of  external  enemies  and  resistances  …  impatiently  lacerated, 
persecuted, gnawed at, assaulted, and maltreated himself; this animal that rubbed itself raw 
on the bars of its cage as one tried to tame it….”
38 The details of why we had to turn our 
aggressive instincts inward are deliberately vague, and don’t much matter.  In Nietzsche’s 
story, stronger people, blond beasts from the north, impose social forms on weaker people, 
for purposes of their own; and it is these social forms that inhibit the expression of the 
aggressive  instincts;  in  Freud’s  it  is  of  course  the  omnipotent  father  who  inhibits  the 
expression of aggression in his child.   
  Freud and Nietzsche wrote of turning aggression against your own instincts, and 
punishing yourself for having them, but it seems to me that there is another possibility here, 
closely related to that but not quite the same.  Nowadays, scientists believe that versions of 
the dominance hierarchy are pervasive among social animals.  When one animal dominates 
another, the subordinate animal gives way to the dominant one in competitive situations, as 
                                                 
37 Civilization and Its Discontents, translated and edited by James Strachey.  W. W. Norton & Co., 1961.  Totem and 
Taboo, translated by James Strachey. W. W. Norton & Co., 1950. 
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when they both want access to a certain bit of food or a mate.  Dominance is sometimes 
established  by  aggression,  and  sometimes maintained  that  way, but not  always:  in  some 
animals dominance hierarchies can be inherited and apparently go unchallenged for longish 
stretches of time. It appears that its evolutionary function of dominance may be to reduce the 
frequency of aggressive encounters in animal life. I think that that dominance is interesting 
in this context, because dominance looks a lot like something that we think of as essentially 
normative:  it looks like authority.  A dominated animal does something that he does not want 
to  do,  or  foregoes  something  that  he  would  like  to  have,  because  he  acknowledges 
something like the standing of another animal. It is not mere fear of the consequences – if 
you successfully dominate your dog, for example, he isn’t afraid of you.  He just recognizes 
that you are in charge, and he is supposed to do what you tell him to. 
  I’m not interested in defending the details of these theories.
39 What I want from 
them  is  the  suggestion  that  the  origin  of  morality  might  rest  in  the  internalization  of 
mechanisms  of  dominance  and  social  control:  that  is,  the  suggestion  that  we  began  to 
become rational animals when we began, as individuals, to exert a kind of dominance over 
ourselves – to inhibit our own instinctive responses.  I’m not going to speculate about how 
exactly it happened, or why.  Nietzsche and Freud make their stories sound like cataclysmic 
events  in  the  lives  of  individuals;  somehow  that  has  to  be  translated  into  evolutionary 
terms.
40  The important point for me now is that in Nietzsche’s story, the internalization of 
                                                 
39 One thing I find attractive in these theories is that they lack the “happy talk” character of some of the 
biological theories, in which morality is all about being nice, sociable, sharing… there is a dark side to the life 
lived in judgment on the self, and these more psychological theories aim to capture that. 
40 It is tempting to speculate that the evolution of individuals capable of a distinctive form of self-control is a 
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the aggressive instincts is explicitly linked with a kind of deepening of consciousness itself.  
He writes: 
All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this is 
what I call the internalization of man:  thus it was that man first developed 
what was later called his “soul.”  The entire inner world, originally as thin as 
if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, 
acquiring  depth,  breadth,  and  height,  in  the  same  measure  as  outward 
discharge was inhibited.
41 
What  I  want  to  suggest,  following  Nietzsche’s  lead,  is  that  the  consequence  of  this 
internalization was a new form of self-consciousness, which set us altogether new kinds of 
problems of its own:  normative problems.   
  So let me rephrase the suggestion with which I started.  I suggested that normative 
self-government is not the result of our awareness of our own mental attitudes; rather our 
awareness of our own mental attitudes is the result of the control we began to assume over 
ourselves and our own responses.  That way of putting it is right in a way, but it doesn’t 
quite capture what I take to be the radical nature of Nietzsche’s suggestion. It makes it 
sound  as  if  our  minds  are  stocked  with  a  full  panoply  of  mental  attitudes,  and  what 
internalization does is turn on the lights so we can see them, and that is not what he says:  
what he says is that our minds acquired depth, breadth, and so on – a dimension they lacked 
before, not one they had in the dark.  So I take the suggestion to be that at least some of our 
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mental attitudes are the products of the internalization:  that our beliefs, desires, emotions, and 
so on, are the result of the new form of consciousness that emerged.
42   
  I  know  that  what  I  am  saying  sounds  mysterious  –  how  could  a  form  of 
consciousness produce its own objects in that way?  Although, for that matter, of course 
there is a way in which forms of consciousness do produce their own objects – just think of 
sensory qualities.  And the way I am describing it also may make it sound as if I think animal 
minds are empty of mental attitudes, that they must lack mental states.  But I don’t believe 
that.  What I have in mind is rather that things we identify as our own attitudes – our 
“beliefs” “desires” and to some extent our “emotions” are the products of the breakdown of 
the teleological consciousness that I have claimed must characterize the nonhuman mind.  
They  are  the  result  of  our  beginning  to  factor  out  and  identify  the  ways  in  which  we 
ourselves contribute to, and so are responsible for, the way the world is for us. 
  Adam Smith can help us out here.  He suggested that we would never think of our 
own minds if we were never exposed to other people.
43  Contrary to what the privileged 
access view of the mind might lead you to suppose, we first spot mental attitudes in other 
people. From my own, untutored, point of view, I am not angry:  I am simply the victim of 
an outrage, and that’s a plain fact about the world.  That is the teleological view of the world 
at  work  in  me:    the  situation  confronting  me  is  one  I  perceive  as  to-be-defeated,  or 
                                                 
42 These views bear some similarity to views I argue for in Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (Oxford:  
Oxford  University  Press,  2009).  There  I  argue  that  we  become  agents  by  taking  control  of  our  own 
movements; here I am arguing that we become mental agents by taking control of the workings of our own 
minds.  I also argue, in Chapter 6, that self-consciousness  produces the “parts of the soul” – reason and 
inclination – just as here I argue that self-consciousness in a sense produces mental attitudes.   
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something like that. But when I see you in that situation, when I’m not in it myself, I see that 
you are getting angry.  There is a distancing use of mental attitude language:  was he in 
danger? well, he believed that he was; well, he was certainly frightened.  A gap between the way 
world seems to me and the way it seems to you appears to me at first as a distortion in the way 
it seems to you; so I conclude that something about you must be distorting the way it seems 
to  you.    If  I  am  a  dominant  animal,  perhaps  I  see  this  as  an  occasion  to  inhibit  your 
response.    
  But when I begin to see occasion to inhibit my own responses, then I also begin to 
regard myself in the way that in Smith’s story, I was regarding you. The identification of 
something as an attitude at work in me is a recognition that I am, or something about me is, 
making some sort of contribution to the way the world is for me.  If being aware of a mental 
attitude, or more properly of the workings of your own mind, is essentially being aware of 
your  own  contribution  to  the  way  the  world  is  for  you,  then  as  Kant  said  our  mental 
attitudes are always  accompanied by an “I.”  I think, I want, I intend.  And from this 
recognition that our own mental activity is implicated in the way the world is for us arises a 
new relation in which we stand to the world.  When we begin to recognize the ways that 
conceptualizing, evaluating, and responding to the world are things that our minds do – that 
is,  things  that  we  do  –  then  we  begin  to  do  them  in  a  whole  new  way,  namely  self-
consciously.  And then we are confronted with a new problem and a whole new set of 
questions, questions about what (if anything) counts as doing these things correctly.  Is this a 
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justification, questions that, so far as we can tell, only human beings ask.
44  And when we 
begin to find answers to those questions, then the use of mental attitude language about 
ourselves no longer carries the implication of distortion: instead it carries the implication of 
normative commitment:  “yes, this is what I believe” “yes, this is the right thing to do.”  To 
believe and act on the basis of such thoughts is to be a normatively self-governed animal.   
 
6. Conclusion 
  I have suggested that the internalization of mechanisms of dominance and social 
control – the attempt to inhibit our own instinctive responses – was the first step in a 
process that led to a kind of general takeover, or attempted takeover, of our own mental 
lives.  Mental states with an essentially normative dimension – states we regard as both 
supported  by,  and  rationally  committing  us  to,  other  states  –  are  the  product  of  this 
takeover,  factored  out  from  the  teleological  consciousness  when  we  identify  our  own 
contribution to the way the world is for us.  The recognition that our own mental activity 
contributes to the way the world is for us leads us to attempt to regulate that contribution, to 
get it right, and that leads to the formation of consciously held standards for constructing 
our own conception of the world and consciously held standards for determining our own 
                                                 
44 In this paper I don’t have space to say much about how such questions are answered.  My view is that we 
answer them by identifying the constitutive principles of mental activity.  The mental activities in question are 
thinking in general, which is constituted by logical principles; forming a conception of the world, which is 
constituted by (roughly) what Kant called the principles of the understanding, and making choices, which is 
constituted  by  the  principles  of  practical  reason.    I  say  more  about  all  this  in  “The  Activity  of  Reason,” 
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actions.  Those are the standards of reason, which we then take to govern these activities.  
That is how we become normatively self-governing animals.  
  But now I must conclude by bringing this all back home to morality. For perhaps 
you may feel that I have only reversed the problem I started out from: I’ve got normative 
self-government on the table, but lost characteristic moral content.  After all why, according 
to this theory, should the kinds of conduct we ordinarily call “moral” represent the correct 
solution  to  the  problem  of  justifying  our  actions?    In  particular,  why  should  altruism, 
cooperation, and fairness, be part of that solution?  In the absence of a particular theory of 
justification, which obviously I can’t give here, it is difficult to be specific, but let me end by 
making a couple of suggestions about how we might get what we ordinarily think of as moral 
content  back  on  the  table.    Both  suggestions  turn  on  this  fact:    that  the  problem  of 
justification arises for an animal for whom the teleological view of the world has broken 
down. 
  The first point is this.  Once we have reflective distance from our grounds of our 
attitudes, and can ask whether we should act on them or not, we need a way of answering 
that question. To ask whether you should indeed flee from something you perceive as to-be-
fled, for instance, is, in the first instance, to ask whether it is really a threat, whether it can really 
harm you.  I say “in the first instance” because at this stage we have not yet arrived at the 
fully practical question.  At this stage the practical question is still mainly instrumental, taking 
it for granted that, say, objects that really can do us harm are to-be-avoided, and only asking 
which objects those are.   When we only think or reason instrumentally, we are still seeing 
the world through the lens of our own desires and interests, and to that extent we are still 
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worth doing, there is no reason to stop with desires and interests that are simply given to us 
by nature.  There is a further question to be asked about when danger is worth facing or harm 
worth incurring and when it is not, not just instrumentally, but for its own sake.  That is not 
just  a  question  about  how  best  to  satisfy  our  interests,  but  a  question  about  what  our 
interests ought to be – in fact, it is essentially the very question whose answer Smith and 
Darwin tried to build into their theories.  So the breakdown of the teleological worldview of 
the non-rational animal means that we can longer take it for granted that we should measure 
the world by our own interests, but instead must form an independent standard of what is 
worth doing for the sake of what.   
  The second point is this: an essential part of overcoming the teleological worldview 
of the animal is recognizing that things don’t exist in relation to me.  The world does not 
does not after all consist of my predators, my prey, my offspring, but of rather of beings 
with an independent existence of their own, who happen to stand in those relationships to 
me.  Getting that fact firmly into view is essential to achieving a rational theoretical conception 
of the world, a conception of a world that exists independently of me and my practical 
interests.  But it is also – intuitively speaking – essential to achieving the conception of the 
world that we nowadays recognize as practically rational –that is to say, as moral.  That 
women do not exist to bear men’s children and keep their houses, that strong young men are 
not fodder for older people’s cannons, that people of color were not born to work in white 
people’s fields, and the poor and ignorant do not exist that the rich may have servants, and 
that other animals are not there for human beings to eat, or to work for us, or to submit to Reflections on the Evolution of Morality                                                                                                               34 
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our experiments
45 – that all of these beings do not exist for us, and with reference simply to 
our interests, but have an independent existence and interests of their own – grasping these 
facts  is essential to forming a theoretical conception of a world that exists independently of 
us as well as a practical conception of the world we must relate to.
46   
  So justification is not merely about how we can best satisfy our own interests, but is 
about what is worth doing for its own sake.  And it must be responsive to the fact that there 
are many other beings, who do not exist just for us, or in relation to us, but independently of 
us, with interests of their own.  If someday we can put those two thoughts together in just 
the right way, perhaps one day we ourselves will become animals in whom morality has 
finally evolved. 
                                                 
45 There is some tendency for people to assume that anyone who supposes there  is a decisive difference 
between human beings and the other animals must also be opposed to the view that human beings have strong 
obligations to the other animals.  I do not agree.  Of course it is important to good moral thinking on this 
subject to understand which morally relevant features human beings and the other animals have in common.  
But the claim I am making in this paper – the human beings are the only moral animals – shows that the other 
animals have no obligations to us, not that we have no obligations to them.  I defend the view that we have 
strong obligations to the other animals in “Fellow Creatures:  Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals” 
available on the web at:  
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/volume25/korsgaard_2005.pdf 
and also available in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Volume 25: 2005, edited by Grethe B. Peterson (Salt 
Lake City:  University of Utah Press, 2005; and in “Interacting with Animals,” in The Oxford Handbook on Ethics 
and Animals, edited by Tom Beauchamp and R. G. Frey (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, forthcoming).  
46 Garrett Cullity,  in a  commentary  on this  paper,  wondered why I did not mention my views about the 
“public” nature of reasons in the context of my attempts to indicate why formally moral motives would turn 
out to have moral content.  To say that reasons are “public” in the sense I have in mind is to say that your 
reasons have normative force not only for you, but for me.  Recognizing that you have interests and reasons of 
your own will then turn out to have moral implications for me.  The answer is really just that I did not have the 
space to defend the publicity of reason in this context.  Interested readers should see The Sources of Normativity, 
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